I’m currently working on what truth is; how we think about impossible things; what material objects are; how to think about essence; and what propositions are.
My major topic at the moment is about how we think meaningfully about impossible things. We might wonder whether some hypothesis is true or false, knowing full well that if it’s in fact false then it couldn’t possibly have been true. False mathematical claims represent impossibilities, for example, yet they are often meaningful. How come? Philosophical claims, too, are often held to be either necessarily true or necessariy false. So, quite probably, the majority of what most philosophers say (with their work hats on) is impossible—but it’s not all meaningless!
I’m also interested in philosophical curiosities such as holes, absences and negative facts. Most philosophers say that such things don’t literally exist. I think they do. That's why doughnuts aren’t just balls of dough, and that’s how claims like ‘there’s no milk in the fridge’ are grounded in reality. Such curiosities tell us something deep about our concept of existence.
I’m drawn to paradoxes—seemingly acceptable premises which lead to absurd conclusions. These lead to my interests in truth and vagueness. Far from being mere philosophers’ games, paradoxes are deep problems calling out for a philosophical solution. In the case of paradoxes about truth and vagueness, the paradoxes have had the best of it, so far.
I’ve previously worked on belief revision and other formal aspects of belief and knowledge.
Anyone can download PDFs of my papers on PhilPapers. You can see who's cited them on Google scholar.
Department of Philosophy
University of Nottingham
NG7 2RD, UK
firstname [dot] lastname [suitable symbol] nottingham.ac.uk